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Despite the centrality of voting costs to the paradox of voting, little effort has been made to 
accurately measure these costs outside of a few spatially limited case studies. In this paper, 
we apply Geographic Information Systems (GIS) tools to validated national election survey 
data from New Zealand. We calculate distance and travel time by road from the place of 
residence to the nearest polling place and combine our time estimate with imputed wages for 
all sample members. Using this new measure of the opportunity cost of voting to predict 
turnout at the individual level, we find that small increases in the opportunity costs of time can 
have large effects in reducing voter turnout. 
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For a rational, self-interested voter, the cost of voting normally exceeds any plausible 
value of expected benefits from the preferred candidate winning.
1   Yet despite these 
calculations, many people vote. One solution to this paradox of voting, used at least since 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968), is to assume some additional (consumption) benefit from 
voting. Thus, a person will choose to vote if the costs (C) are outweighed by the benefits (B) 
that flow from the preferred candidate winning, discounted by the probability of casting the 
deciding vote (P), and allowing for the consumption benefit (D) that results from the feeling 
of satisfaction in performing one’s civic duty: 
. D PB C + <  
Hence, efforts in this literature have turned to developing complex ‘group-based’ models that 
explain why voters might get a consumption benefit from voting (Feddersen, 2004).  
But without clear information on the costs, C, it is difficult to know whether consumption 
benefits need to be large or small to salvage the rational voter model (Niemi, 1976). Accurate 
estimates also are needed because if costs and benefits of voting are small, the decision to 
vote is sensitive to small variations in either term (Aldrich, 1993); if these small effects are 
hard to measure, individual voter turnout will seem largely random (Matsusaka and Palda, 
1999). Yet most studies struggle to measure the costs of voting at the individual level because 
of inadequate data and resort to using imperfect proxies. For example, Cebula and Toma 
(2006) use state-level median family income as their sole proxy for the opportunity cost of 
voting. In addition to being a crude measure, this ignores the early argument by Frey (1971) 
that even if people with high income face a high opportunity cost, they may participate more 
                                                 
1 Feddersen (2004) considers a two-candidate election with five million voters and candidate 1’s expected vote 
share of 50.1 percent; the benefit to a voter who prefers candidate 2 must be more than eight billion times 
greater than the cost of voting, in order for expected benefits to outweigh costs. Such a ratio of benefits is 
inconceivable for any voter, with typical stakes in an election (in terms of the amount of compensation needed 
for indifference between who wins) of only a few thousand dollars (Tollison and Willett, 1973).   
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in politics – including voting – because of greater productivity in their use of time when 
performing political activities.
2 
In this paper, we use validated national election unit record survey data from the New 
Zealand Election Study (NZES) to examine the impact of the opportunity cost of time on 
voting behaviour. We improve on previous work by exploiting both individual level 
socioeconomic information that allows us to impute wage rates for all sample members and 
address information that allows us to use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) tools to 
calculate distance and travel time by road from each individual’s place of residence to the 
nearest polling place. Combined, this information gives a new, more accurate, measure of the 
opportunity cost of voting than is used in previous papers in the literature. 
  The NZES data have several advantages over the data used in previous studies. First, the 
survey data on whether each respondent voted is validated by comparing the data with the 
lists of votes cast that are held by the registrar of electors in each electorate. In contrast, many 
surveys used in the literature do not validate self-reports even though voting is prone to over-
reporting since it is seen as a socially desirable activity.
3 Systemic overstatement of voting 
generates a non-random misclassification error, so when voting is the dependent variable it 
induces bias in all of the regression coefficients (Hausman et al, 1998).
4 Second,  voter 
registration is compulsory in New Zealand so variation in individual turnout is not driven by 
differences in voter registration, as happens in the US.
5 Third, under New Zealand’s Mixed 
Member Proportional (MMP) voting system, each voter has the same weight in determining 
overall proportionality of parties in the Parliament, irrespective of the marginality of the 
                                                 
2 Tollison and Willett (1973) point out that predictions about whether higher or lower income individuals have a 
greater incentive to vote depend on both income and substitution effects, and so will be a priori unclear. 
3 For example, Matsusaka and Palda (1999) use surveys from four national elections in Canada where the rate of 
self-reported voting in their samples was 16 percentage points higher, on average, than the actual turnout in each 
election. Similarly, 22 percent of non-voters in local government elections in Sweden claimed to have voted 
when they were surveyed (Karp and Brockington, 2005). 
4 Even more non-randomness may come from the tendency for false reports of voting to be more likely for some 
demographic groups than others (Silver et al, 1986). 
5 Even though registration is compulsory, there is no legal compulsion to vote, unlike the case in neighbouring 
Australia.   
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electorate they live in.
6 Finally, at a general election in New Zealand, all voters have just two 
votes – one for a Party and one for a Member of Parliament for their electorate; referenda are 
extremely rare and there are never other jurisdictional positions to fill. Thus, the cognitive 
costs of voting should nor vary between precincts, unlike in the United States where some 
voters face many more choices than others. 
  New Zealand is also an ideal case study for using the accessibility of polling places as a 
measure of the opportunity cost of time facing potential voters. First, almost all resident 
voters cast their vote in person on election day, rather than beforehand.
7 In contrast, studies of 
how accessibility affects turnout in the United States have to deal with the complication that a 
high proportion of voters cast an early vote or vote by mail (Dyck and Gimpel, 2005). Second, 
Election Day is always a Saturday, so it is reasonable to assume that the average voter travels 
from their home to the polls, rather than from their workplace.
8 This lets us use the polling 
place closest to the place of residence when estimating the opportunity cost of time. Third, 
we can assume that little time is spent waiting at the polling booth due to congestion; relative 
to other countries, New Zealand appears to have ample polling places per voter. The 69 
electorates in New Zealand each have an average of about 50 polling places, and at each an 
average of just 600 votes are cast in the 10 hours that it is open on election day.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the previous literature 
on using accessibility to measure the cost of voting. In Section 3, we describe the survey data 
                                                 
6 The exception is that a party that would not be represented in the Parliament if it got less than the threshold 
five percent of the party vote can still have Members of Parliament to match its vote share, if it wins at least one 
electorate seat. While voters in that particular electorate could have more than average influence, this situation 
only rarely occurs. In the empirical analysis below, the results are robust to including electorate fixed effects. 
7 In the 2005 national election studied here, less than seven percent of votes from resident voters were cast 
before Election Day. 
8 Evidence for this assumption also comes from the low share of Special Votes, which are for people voting 
outside of their home electorate on Election Day. In the 2005 election studied here, these were just 6.7 percent 
of total votes cast. Moreover, even for those who work on Saturdays, they must be allowed to leave their 
workplace no later than 3pm for the purpose of voting (or leave for at least two hours if they have essential work 
that goes after 3pm) and their employer cannot make deductions from the employee’s remuneration for the time 
taken off. See Section 162 of the Electoral Act, 1993.   
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we use and how we construct the measures of distance and time costs of voting. In Section 4, 
the estimation strategies and empirical results are presented. The conclusions are in Section 5. 
2. Previous  Literature 
Outside of economics there is a small but growing literature that uses Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) tools to create measures of voting costs. In one of the first such 
studies, Gimpel and Schuknecht (2003) investigated the impact that distance to polling 
stations and impedance (the time and effort of the commute) had on voter turnout in three 
suburban Maryland counties in the 2000 Presidential election, finding a positive impact of 
ease of access on turnout. In related work, Dyck and Gimpel (2005) studied the choices that 
voters in Clark county, Nevada (where Las Vegas is located) made between voting in person 
on Election Day, voting early (but in person), mailing in an absentee ballot, or not voting. 
This research was extended to a comparison with Bernalillo county, New Mexico (wherein 
lies Albuquerque) by Gimpel et al. (2006). 
One drawback of these early studies is that they did not use an actual road network to 
calculate distance (or time). Instead they used “Manhattan distance” which assumes a regular 
grid layout of streets between origin and destination, with no allowance for sinuosity.
9 This 
assumption improves upon straight-line (‘crow-fly’) distance but it still induces non-random 
measurement error that may bias regression coefficients. The non-randomness is because 
actual roads will sometimes follow irregular features such as rivers and broken topography, 
so Manhattan distance always understates actual distance. In contrast, Haspel and Knotts 
(2005) use GIS-based road distances to study the impact of accessibility on voting in the 
2001 mayoral race in Atlanta. Specifically, they calculate the shortest path over city streets 
between each individual’s home address and the polling place to which he or she was 
assigned by their optimization software (with a criterion of distance minimization). These 
                                                 
9 Manhattan distance is defined as: di=|(x1-x2)+( y1-y2)| where x, y are the longitude and latitude coordinates for 
the origin (1) and the destination (2).   
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distances were quite short, with a median value of 0.69 miles (1.1 kilometres), but they still 
mattered to the odds of voting. For householders with cars, the predicted odds of voting 
dropped from 0.464 at 0.01 miles (20 metres) to 0.385 at the median distance of 0.69 miles.
10 
More recently, political scientists have exploited natural experiments from changes in the 
accessibility of polling places following the consolidation of voting precincts. In the 
California recall election of 2003 that replaced Gray Davis with Arnold Schwarzenegger, Los 
Angeles County reduced the number of polling places from 5,231 used in 2002 to just 1,885. 
Brady and McNulty (2011) show that this increased the average distance to the nearest 
polling place from 0.35 to 0.50 miles, and resulted in a three percentage point decline in in-
person voting in consolidated voting precincts compared to unconsolidated ones. Most of this 
decline is attributed to search costs of finding a new polling place rather than to the 
transportation cost of increased distance, and is partly offset by a rise in absentee voting. At a 
much finer spatial scale, McNulty et al (2009) examine the effects of consolidating eight 
polling places down to five in the 2006 school budget referendum in Vestal Central School 
District of New York state. Even among the habitual voters who participate in these local 
referenda, consolidation and the increase in average distance (from 0.97 to 1.30 miles) to the 
polls decreased voter turnout by about seven percentage points. 
In summary, this literature from political science suggests that small changes in voting 
costs may have significant impacts on turnout. But the context for each study is spatially 
limited, usually considering only a single city or a few counties, so there are reasons to be 
concerned about the external validity of the findings. Moreover, in almost all of the studies 
the proxy for cost is just a measure of distance – and sometimes a potentially error-prone 
measure such as Manhattan distance. In no case has there been an attempt to combine the 
estimates of travelling time with individual-specific time valuations, so as to create an overall 
                                                 
10 A drawback of their study is that the data are from voterfiles, so are restricted to those citizens actually 
registered to vote, which creates a potential sample selection bias, and also limits the availability of predictor 
variables compared with what would be available in surveys.   
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dollar cost for the amount of time that would be spent going to vote. There also has yet to be 
a nationwide study using GIS tools to measure voting costs and their impact on turnout, 
which is the aim of the current study. 
3.   Data  
Since 1990, the New Zealand Election Study (NZES) has surveyed individuals of voting 
age (18 and over) after each general election (held every three years), using self-completion 
postal questionnaires and telephone survey top-ups (Vowles, 2010). As noted above, the 
survey self-reports of voting are validated by checking against the lists of votes cast that are 
held by the registrar of electors. The surveys also provide a variety of information on 
respondents’ demographic details (age, gender, ethnicity), marital, employment and 
migration status, level of education, household income (in eight brackets), location and home 
ownership status. In addition, they include factors found in other studies to influence voting, 
such as participation in religious observance and prior voting history. 
In this study, we use data from the 2005 general election, for which the NZES sampled 
just over 3,000 respondents.
11 Since the NZES is a postal survey there is no clustering used 
but sampling weights are formed to ensure national representativeness (hence, dealing with 
any uneven sampling probabilities and non-response bias). All of the analyses reported below 
use these weights, along with heteroskedasticity-robust measures of sampling error. 
Although the NZES is a postal survey, the exact addresses of respondents are not 
included in the public use data, so as to maintain confidentiality. But a close approximation is 
provided by the survey reporting the census meshblock that each respondent’s residence lies 
within. There are almost 40,000 mesh blocks in New Zealand, each having an average of just 
                                                 
11 In the raw data files, there are almost 3,700 observations but with missing values for some of the covariates 
used in our models we have a sample of n=3,005. The voting rate and the average distance from the polls are the 
same in the full sample and the estimation sample, supporting the assumption that the observations are missing 
at random.   
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110 residents, so this is a very finely scaled spatial unit.
12 Moreover, a population-weighted 
centroid for every meshblock is provided by Statistics New Zealand to give even more 
accuracy, and that is what we use here as the best estimate of the location of the respondent’s 
dwelling when estimating the road distance and travel time to the nearest polling place. 
The names of all polling places used in the 2005 general election were obtained from the 
New Zealand Electoral Commission website. In most cases, these were located in schools, 
and civic and church halls. All locations were then geocoded using ESRI ArcGIS Geocoder 
with the Core Records System street address data and Google Maps to provide exact latitude 
and longitude coordinates. Occasionally, the Street View feature of Google Maps was used to 
virtually drive along roads and locate polling places that had no street numbers. For several 
rural locations, we also contacted key informants (such as local government officers and staff 
at visitor information centres) to verify the correct locations.  
  The algorithm within Google Maps for choosing shortest road distances was used to 
measure the distance between the population-weighted centroid of the meshblock that each 
respondent lived in and the nearest polling booth.
13 When calculating these travel times, we 
assume that the mode of transport is by motor vehicle. New Zealand has the second highest 
car ownership rate in the world (behind Luxembourg), at almost 600 cars per 1000 population. 
This ownership rate is much higher than would be predicted by income levels (IMF, 2008), 
due to the low population density and underdeveloped public transport network. It is 
therefore likely that the typical journey to the polls was made by motor vehicle. 
  In order to convert the travel time estimates into a measure of opportunity costs of time, 
we follow an approach used in Skinner (1987) to impute estimates for a variable that is absent 
from one survey, using a regression estimated from another survey that contains a richer set 
                                                 
12 In terms of physical area, a typical urban mesh block would, if perfectly square, have dimensions of just over 
200 metres (0.13 miles). 




14 Since the NZES has no information available on wages and earnings, we use 
data from the 2005 New Zealand Income Survey (NZIS),
 15 which  collects  very  detailed 
labour market data including wages for a sample of n=13,182 working individuals of voting 
age, to impute wages in NZES. While the NZES does not collect wage data, it does collect 
information on personal and household income in brackets, which are strong predictors of 
individual wage rates in the NZIS. Following Skinner, we estimate a wage regression using 
the NZIS controlling for all variables common to both surveys and the coefficients from this 
regression are then used to predict hourly wage rates for all respondents in the NZES.
 16 
Hence, we obtain an estimated value of time for everyone, regardless of whether they are 
wage workers; this is appropriate since leisure and other non-market time uses also have an 
implicit price that must be accounted for when studying the decision of whether to vote. 
 4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 present means and standard deviations of the variables we use in our analysis. 
Because many rural areas in New Zealand are quite isolated, we present estimates throughout 
that both include and exclude them. The voting rate was 81.5 percent in both the national 
sample and the urban sub-sample (all estimates use population sampling weights). The 
average distance by road to the nearest polling place is 1.5 kilometres, or just under one mile, 
while in urban areas it is one kilometre (0.6 miles). This is comparable to the distances found 
in previous studies from the US. Based on this distance, the average return trip by car to the 
nearest polling place would take just five minutes of travelling time, while for urban areas it 
                                                 
14 Skinner used a regression estimated on Consumer Expenditure Survey data to impute consumption estimates 
for households in the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. 
15 This survey is run as a supplement to New Zealand’s main labour market survey (the Household Labour 
Force Survey) and hence is equivalent to the March CPS in the United States 
16 The following controls are included: age, gender, the personal and household income bracket, employment 
status, 2-digit industry and occupation, highest level of education, ethnicity, urbanity and region. The R-squared 
from this regression is 0.386 indicating that bracketed income along with other socioeconomic characteristics 
are strong predictors of wage rates.   
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would take only four minutes. Using the imputed wages, which average just under $28 per 
hour (US$19.50 at the time of the election), this is equivalent to a time cost of $2.30 
(US$1.60) nationally and $1.80 (US$1.25) in urban areas. Obviously, allowing for parking 
(albeit, often free on Saturdays) and any waiting at the polls would increase this slightly, but 
there is no information to estimate these costs, unlike the time costs of travel. 
The means of the respondent characteristics used in the model predicting turnout are also 
presented in Table 1. These characteristics include age, gender, and marital status, whether 
the respondent is an immigrant, and dummy variables for three ethnic groups (Asian and 
‘other’ are the excluded category). Also included in the models are indicators for highest 
education level, for lack of religious observance, for whether employed, whether a home 
owner, whether in an urban area, and whether household income is in the bottom three or top 
three of the eight income brackets used by the survey. Finally, there is an indicator for 
whether respondents had voted in the local government elections from the previous year, to 
proxy for their attitude towards the civic duty of voting. All these variables have previously 
appeared in models predicting individual turnout (see e.g. Matsusaka and Palda, 1999). 
4.2. Empirical Specification 
We use maximum likelihood probit estimation:  
( ) ( ) ) 1 ( 1 Pr β j j j p x x Φ = =  
where pj is an indicator variable for whether the jth individual voted in the 2005 general 
election, Φ is the standard cumulative normal, xj is the vector of explanatory variables for 
individual j and β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. These probit coefficients are 
not directly interpretable, but marginal effects for continuous variables can be calculated (at 
the mean) as: 
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where b is the vector of estimated coefficients and φ is the normal density. For dummy 
variables, the discrete change in probability when the dummy variable switches from zero to 
one is calculated as  ) ( ) ( 0 1 b x b x Φ − Φ  where  x x x = = 0 1  except that the ith elements of  1 x  
and  0 x  are set to one and zero, respectively. Only the marginal effects (and z-statistics based 
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors) are reported in the tables that follow.  
4.3 Estimation Results 
The probit models are estimated with either distance, or time, or cost as the main 
independent variable, along with 16 control variables to account for potentially relevant 
determinants of voting that may be correlated with the cost of going to the polls. The reason 
for not including distance, time and cost in the same equation is because of the high 
correlation between these variables, which is highest for distance and time (r=0.90) but is 
also statistically significant for distance and cost (r=0.69). Hence, the results for each probit 
model illustrate different aspects of the opportunity cost of voting, while reporting all three 
models allows readers to interpret the role that the modelling assumptions (such as the speed 
of road travel and the imputation of wages) have on the results. 
The results in Table 2 show that distance, time and cost are all statistically significant 
determinants of individual turnout. The p-values for the null hypotheses that these variables 
have no effect on the decision to vote range from 0.02 (time) to 0.04 (distance), indicating 
that accurately measuring aspects of voting costs can give precisely estimated effects on 
turnout. In terms of magnitudes, each one kilometre (0.6 mile) increase in distance to the 
nearest polling place reduces turnout by one percentage point; each minute of travelling time 
reduces turnout by one-half of a percentage point, and each one-dollar of opportunity cost 
reduces it by 0.8  percentage points. A standard deviation increase in any of these three 
variables would reduce turnout by three percentage points.   
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In contrast to the importance of the cost terms, most of the individual characteristics are 
not statistically significant determinants of the voting decision. Amongst the demographic 
factors, only age and ethnicity matter; voting rates go up by two percentage points for every 
ten years of age (the affect appears linear, since a quadratic in age was statistically 
insignificant), and are approximately 15 percentage points lower for the Maori and Pacific 
ethnic groups, although only the effect for Maori is precisely estimated. Voting rates are 
higher for respondents from higher income households, but the effect is imprecisely 
measured and only attains borderline statistical significance (p=0.07) in model (3). 
The other variable that appears to matter to voting in the general election is whether the 
individual voted in the local government election of the previous year. The turnout for those 
who did vote previously is almost seven percentage points higher. One concern with 
including voting in the local government elections as a covariate might be that this voting 
also reflects the accessibility of the polling places. However, in New Zealand, all local 
government elections are postal ballots, so the correlation between distance to the general 
election polling places and whether the person voted in the local government election is zero 
(r=-0.005). Thus, there is no change in the magnitude of the distance, time or cost variables 
(and a slight increase in their statistical significance) if the previous voting behaviour is 
excluded from the model. 
The distance to the nearest polling place varies between electorates, since the electorate 
boundaries are redistricted after every Census to ensure roughly equal populations but the 
population density is uneven over space. Since turnout also varies between electorates, one 
concern with the results reported in Table 2 may be that they reflect omitted variable bias. To 
address this, the models are re-estimated with fixed effects for each electorate (Table 3). 




2 to double, they have no effect at all on the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the distance, time and cost variables. 
Another possible concern with the results reported in Table 2 could be that the findings of 
significant distance effects are driven by a small proportion of rural voters who may face a 
longer drive to the polls.
17 In fact, the opposite is true. The impact of distance, time and cost 
in reducing voter turnout is stronger in urban areas (Table 4). Specifically, for the urban 
population, each one kilometre increase in distance to the nearest polling place reduces 
turnout by two percentage points; each minute of travelling time reduces turnout by 0.8 of a 
percentage point, and each one-dollar of opportunity cost reduces it by two percentage points. 
The effect of the opportunity cost of time in lowering urban turnout is very precisely 
estimated, with p=0.001.
18 
To illustrate how individual turnout can be affected by the opportunity costs of travelling 
to the polls, the models in column (3) of Table 2 and Table 4 were used to simulate turnout 
probability as the opportunity cost increased from $1 to $20 (US$0.70 to US$14). In these 
simulations all of the other variables are held at their mean, so the confidence intervals 
quickly expand as the simulations approach the extremes of the observed costs (Figure 1). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that even small increases in the opportunity cost of travelling to vote 
may have large effects in reducing voter turnout. For example, at an opportunity cost of $10 
(two standard deviations above the national mean, and equivalent to US$7), the predicted 
national turnout would be just 75 percent, which is down seven percentage points from the 
mean. In urban areas, the decline is even larger, with a predicted turnout of just 62 percent 
when opportunity costs are $10. 
 
                                                 
17 However, even in the rural sector the maximum distances are not especially large, with the 99
th percentile of 
road distances to the closest polling place being 22 kilometres (14 miles). Because of this lack of geographical 
outliers, there are no differences in the results if logarithms of the distance and cost measures are used. Since 
there is an easy interpretation for units of kilometres, minutes and dollars, we only report the unlogged results. 
18 These results are also robust to including electorate fixed effects.   
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4.4 Non-nested tests 
The two models with road distance and opportunity costs of travel time as the main 
independent variable of interest are non-nested, in the sense that it is not possible to impose a 
set of linear restrictions to derive one model from the other. But a formal comparison of these 
two models may help guide other researchers deciding whether the effort of imputing a wage 
for all sample respondents and calculating their opportunity cost of travel time is worthwhile. 
Forming a ‘compound’ model with both distance and costs is not advisable, both because of 
the potential multicollinearity problem described above and also because such an approach is 
a less powerful statistical procedure than are formal non-nested tests (Pesaran, 1982).  
Instead, we use the Pesaran (1974) version of a Cox likelihood ratio test of the validity of 
one linear model, H0 as opposed to its non-nested alternative H1. The test can be described in 
general terms, as follows:  
H0:  0 0 0 u b x y + =  
H1:  1 1 1 u b x y + =  
where x0 and x1 are matrices of n observations on explanatory variables that are not linear 
combinations of one and other, b0 and b1 are corresponding parameter vectors, u0 and ul are 
random errors with zero mean and variance-covariance matrices  I
2
0 σ and  I
2
1 σ (I is an identity 
matrix of order n). Constructing the test statistic involves six steps, where in what follows we 
use the notation  : 1 , 0 , ) (
1 = ′ ′ − =
− i x x x x I M i i i i i  
(i)  Regress y on x0 to form  0 0 ˆ ˆ b x y =   
(ii)  Regress the fitted values from (i),  , ˆ
0 0b x  on x1 to form residuals: 0 0 1 ˆ b x M  
(iii)  Calculate the sum of squared residuals from (ii),  0 0 1 0 0 ˆ ˆ b x M x b ′ ′  
(iv)  Regress the residuals from (ii) on x0  
(v)  Calculate the sum of squared residuals from (iv),  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 ˆ ˆ b x M M M x b ′ ′    
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(vi)  Calculate the test statistic  v s N ˆ =  which is N(0,1) under H0, where:  




1 b x M x b n n s ′ ′ + = σ σ  
2
0 0 1 0 0
2
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
2





0 ˆ , ˆ σ σ  are SSE0/n and SSE1/n, where SSE is sum of squared errors. 
The decision procedure for the test is to reject H0 for negative (since this is a lower tail test) 
values of  v s ˆ  exceeding the critical value from the standard Normal tables. After testing H0 
versus H1, the procedure is reversed with H1 replacing H0 in the above steps. 
To implement the Pesaran non-nested test, the models in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 
were re-run, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) so that the interpretation is as a Linear 
Probability Model (LPM). This is because the likelihood ratio theory for the Pesaran (1974) 
non-nested test is developed for OLS rather than for Probit models. This change in the 
estimator to using an LPM rather than Probit makes almost no difference compared with what 
is reported in Table 4, with the point estimates on distance and cost both remaining at -0.02 
and the t-statistics being approximately 0.2 lower than the z-statistics reported in Table 4. 
When the distance-based model is H0 it is soundly rejected against H1, the cost-based 
model. The test statistic is -2.59, which is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. 
However, when the test procedure is reversed, with H1 replacing H0 as the model under test, 
there is no rejection of the cost-based model in favour of the distance-based model. 
Specifically, the test statistic is only 0.34, which is not statistically significant (p<0.37). In 
other words, this direct confrontation of the two models favours the use of an opportunity 
cost of time variable, rather than just using road distance as a proxy. Thus, the effort to 
exploit individual-level socioeconomic information so as to impute wages for all sample 
respondents and then calculate the dollar value of their opportunity cost of travel time is 
supported by these results. The non-nested testing results imply that this new, more accurate   
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measure of the opportunity cost of voting should be used instead of the simpler, distance-
based proxies that have previously been used in the US literature. 
 5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we use validated national election unit record survey data from the New 
Zealand Election Study (NZES) to examine the impact of the opportunity cost of time on 
voting behaviour. We improve on previous work by exploiting both individual level 
socioeconomic information that allows us to impute wage rates for all sample members and 
address information that allows us to use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) tools to 
calculate distance and travel time by road from each individual’s place of residence to the 
nearest polling place. We demonstrate that combining this information to measure the 
opportunity cost of voting for each individual provides a more accurate measure of voting 
costs than is used in previous papers in the literature. 
Our analysis finds that small increases in the opportunity costs of time have large effects 
in reducing voter turnout for a national election in New Zealand. For example, at an 
opportunity cost of $10, the predicted national turnout would be just 75 percent, which is 
down seven percentage points from the mean. Our findings thus confirm the conjecture first 
made by Niemi (1976, p.117) that “if the B (benefits) or PB (benefits weighted by the 
probability that a person’s vote matters) term is indeed quite small, then a small increase in 
the cost of voting – such as driving a mile instead of a half-mile to the polls – would 
significantly reduce turnout.” This responsiveness of turnout to small costs is also suggestive 
that the consumption benefits of voting need not be very large in order for it to be rational for 
many people to vote. 
Overall, our findings are quite similar to those from Haspel and Knotts (2005), who 
examine the 2001 mayoral race in Atlanta, and McNulty et al. (2009), who examine a school 
budget referendum in Vestal Central School District of New York state. Given that we are   
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examining a general election in a country with ample polling places per voter, weekend 
voting, and little road congestion, it is perhaps surprising that we find that small increases in 
the opportunity cost of time can discourage individuals from voting. Hence, it seems that 
initiatives to allow online voting and postal voting – as in more common in the US – may 
lead to greater voter turnout even in this quite different context to the settings that have 
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Figure 1. The Effect of the Opportunity Cost of Travel Time on Predicted Turnout 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  National Sample  Urban Sub-sample 
 Mean Std  Dev Mean  Std  Dev
Dependent variable = 1 if voted, 0 if not  0.815 0.389 0.815  0.389
Road distance (km) to closest polling booth  1.530 2.500 1.017  1.183
Travel time (mins) to closest polling booth  5.105 6.216 3.908  3.641
Time cost ($) of reaching polling booth  2.322 3.406 1.837  2.190
Imputed wage ($ per hour)  27.759 17.358 27.968  17.377
Age 45.547 16.155 44.804  16.216
Dummy = 1 if Female  0.483 0.500 0.476  0.500
Dummy = 1 if Married  0.682 0.466 0.662  0.473
Dummy = 1 if not born in New Zealand  0.194 0.396 0.200  0.400
Dummy = 1 if < 3 years at current address  0.113 0.316 0.118  0.322
Ethnic group is European/Pakeha  0.845 0.362 0.839  0.367
Ethnic group is Maori  0.128 0.334 0.123  0.329
Ethnic group is Pacific  0.027 0.162 0.030  0.172
Dummy = 1 if no religious observance  0.121 0.326 0.123  0.329
Highest education level is Tertiary  0.516 0.500 0.535  0.499
Employed full- or part-time  0.702 0.457 0.713  0.452
Urban resident  0.832 0.374 1.000  0.000
Homeowner 0.697 0.459 0.682  0.466
Lower household income (< $16,000)  0.063 0.242 0.063  0.243
Higher household income ( > $59,000)  0.489  0.500  0.501  0.500
Voted in 2004 local govt elections  0.503  0.500  0.502  0.500
Sample size  3,005   2,452 
Notes: 
 Means and standard deviations are weighted by the population sampling weights.  
 




Table 2. Marginal Effects from Probit Models of the Decision to Vote – National Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Road distance (km) to closest polling booth  -0.010     
 (2.09)*     
Travel time (mins) to closest polling booth    -0.005   
   (2.37)*   
Time cost ($) of reaching polling booth      -0.008 
     (2.25)* 
Age 0.002  0.002  0.002 
 (2.01)*  (2.01)*  (2.16)* 
Dummy = 1 if Female  -0.031  -0.032  -0.024 
 (1.29)  (1.33)  (0.99) 
Dummy = 1 if Married  -0.012  -0.012  -0.013 
 (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.43) 
Dummy = 1 if not born in New Zealand  -0.054  -0.055  -0.053 
 (1.49)  (1.49)  (1.46) 
Dummy = 1 if < 3 years at current address  -0.034  -0.035  -0.031 
 (0.83)  (0.86)  (0.78) 
Ethnic group is European/Pakeha  0.034  0.036  0.035 
 (0.84)  (0.90)  (0.87) 
Ethnic group is Maori  -0.152  -0.150  -0.150 
  (3.60)** (3.61)** (3.58)** 
Ethnic group is Pacific  -0.154  -0.159  -0.154 
 (1.76)+  (1.80)+  (1.76)+ 
Dummy = 1 if no religious observance  0.029  0.029  0.031 
 (0.87)  (0.85)  (0.93) 
Highest education level is Tertiary  0.021  0.022  0.023 
 (0.79)  (0.82)  (0.89) 
Employed full- or part-time  0.011  0.010  0.019 
 (0.39)  (0.34)  (0.64) 
Urban  resident  -0.027 -0.031 -0.017 
 (0.81)  (0.92)  (0.51) 
Homeowner  -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.50)  (0.45)  (0.47) 
Lower household income (< $16,000)  -0.010  -0.011  -0.015 
 (0.20)  (0.24)  (0.31) 
Higher household income ( > $59,000)  0.041  0.041  0.050 
 (1.50)  (1.50)  (1.80)+ 
Voted in 2004 local govt elections  0.065  0.065  0.064 
  (2.61)** (2.63)** (2.55)* 
Pseudo-R
2 0.061  0.063  0.061 
Wald test: All slopes = 0  80.27**  80.42**  79.08** 
Notes: 
The coefficients give the change in the probability of voting for a one-unit change in each explanatory variable. 
Numbers in ( ) are z-statistics, calculated from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The sample size is 
3,005 and the estimates are weighted by the population sampling weights. The models all include an intercept. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 




Table 3. Marginal Effects from Probit Models of the Decision to Vote – National Sample 
With Electorate Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Road distance (km) to closest polling booth  -0.010     
  (2.33)*    
Travel time (mins) to closest polling booth    -0.005   
   (2.56)*   
Time cost ($) of reaching polling booth      -0.007 
     (2.46)* 
Age 0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (1.85)+ (1.86)+ (2.03)* 
Dummy = 1 if Female  -0.029  -0.030  -0.022 
  (1.36) (1.40) (1.03) 
Dummy = 1 if Married  -0.018  -0.018  -0.019 
 (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.77) 
Dummy = 1 if not born in New Zealand  -0.068  -0.069  -0.068 
  (2.06)* (2.07)* (2.04)* 
Dummy = 1 if < 3 years at current address  -0.037  -0.038  -0.035 
  (1.05) (1.07) (0.99) 
Ethnic group is European/Pakeha  0.035  0.036  0.036 
  (0.97) (0.98) (0.98) 
Ethnic group is Maori  -0.130  -0.126  -0.126 
  (2.26)* (2.21)* (2.20)* 
Ethnic group is Pacific  -0.121  -0.125  -0.122 
  (1.55) (1.59) (1.55) 
Dummy = 1 if no religious observance  0.031  0.030  0.033 
  (1.07) (1.03) (1.14) 
Highest education level is Tertiary  0.011  0.013  0.014 
  (0.47) (0.54) (0.60) 
Employed full- or part-time  0.014  0.012  0.021 
  (0.54) (0.49) (0.82) 
Urban  resident  -0.043 -0.045 -0.033 
  (1.46) (1.54) (1.08) 
Homeowner  -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.35) (0.31) (0.31) 
Lower household income (< $16,000)  -0.037  -0.039  -0.043 
  (0.81) (0.87) (0.95) 
Higher household income ( > $59,000)  0.043  0.043  0.052 
  (1.74)+ (1.76)+ (2.07)* 
Voted in 2004 local govt elections  0.075  0.076  0.073 
  (3.39)** (3.43)** (3.29)** 
Electorate fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Pseudo-R
2 0.126  0.127  0.126 
Wald test: All slopes = 0  196.32**  200.67**  193.28** 
Notes: 
The coefficients give the change in the probability of voting for a one-unit change in each explanatory variable. 
Numbers in ( ) are z-statistics, calculated from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The sample size is 
3,005 and the estimates are weighted by the population sampling weights. The models all include an intercept 
and 64 electorate fixed effects. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Marginal Effects from Probit Models of the Decision to Vote – Urban Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Road distance (km) to closest polling booth  -0.019     
 (2.17)*     
Travel time (mins) to closest polling booth    -0.008   
   (2.57)*   
Time cost ($) of reaching polling booth      -0.020 
     (3.47)** 
Age 0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (1.85)+ (1.89)+ (2.01)* 
Dummy = 1 if Female  -0.038  -0.038  -0.023 
  (1.45) (1.44) (0.88) 
Dummy = 1 if Married  0.009  0.008  0.009 
  (0.26) (0.24) (0.29) 
Dummy = 1 if not born in New Zealand  -0.045  -0.044  -0.047 
  (1.12) (1.11) (1.16) 
Dummy = 1 if < 3 years at current address  -0.039  -0.038  -0.034 
  (0.87) (0.87) (0.78) 
Ethnic group is European/Pakeha  0.051  0.054  0.054 
  (1.16) (1.22) (1.23) 
Ethnic group is Maori  -0.155  -0.152  -0.154 
  (3.43)** (3.44)** (3.47)** 
Ethnic group is Pacific  -0.171  -0.180  -0.175 
  (1.90)+ (1.98)* (1.93)+ 
Dummy = 1 if no religious observance  0.017  0.018  0.019 
  (0.45) (0.48) (0.51) 
Highest education level is Tertiary  0.030  0.029  0.035 
  (1.02) (1.00) (1.22) 
Employed full- or part-time  0.001  0.003  0.016 
  (0.02) (0.09) (0.51) 
Homeowner  -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 
  (0.32) (0.31) (0.20) 
Lower household income (< $16,000)  -0.036  -0.037  -0.039 
  (0.68) (0.70) (0.75) 
Higher household income ( > $59,000)  0.043  0.042  0.062 
  (1.42) (1.39) (1.96)+ 
Voted in 2004 local govt elections  0.058  0.059  0.058 
  (2.13)* (2.18)* (2.16)* 
Pseudo-R
2 0.074  0.076  0.083 
Wald test: All slopes = 0  81.92**  82.09**  84.79** 
Notes: 
The coefficients give the change in the probability of voting for a one-unit change in each explanatory variable. 
Numbers in ( ) are z-statistics, calculated from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The sample size is 
2,452 and the estimates are weighted by the population sampling weights. The models all include an intercept. 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 